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RECONSTRUING WTO LEGITIMACY DEBATES
Michael Fakhri *
ABSTRACT
There is an emerging consensus that the WTO is in grave need of institutional
redesign. For the last fifteen years, questions of WTO institutional reform
have been framed as a matter of improving the WTO’s legitimacy. This Article
suggests that thinking about WTO redesign as a matter of improving its
legitimacy limits our ability to fundamentally appreciate what the WTO’s
function and purpose is and conceptualize what it should be. It would be more
useful to know what is exactly at stake and what have been the social, political,
and economic implications of the legitimacy debate thus far.
The legitimacy debate appears in discussions regarding constitutionalization,
the dispute settlement system, and non-state actor participation and
institutional transparency. The divisions between arguments in the legitimacy
debate are usually understood to be between rule-based constitutionalization
versus economic rights constitutionalization, sympathy versus skepticism
regarding non-state actor participation, and support for a more legalized
dispute-settlement system versus a more politicized dispute-settlement system.
By reconstruing the legitimacy debate, the Article uncovers how what at first
seem to be incongruent positions appear to be more related. Constitutional
discourse draws from a desire to reduce politics in international trade and is a
way of subordinating the state to markets or international institutions. Dispute
settlement debates are a way to negotiate the relationship between the WTO
and the state. Participation and transparency arguments derive from a shared
empirical assumption that the WTO’s power to govern globally is pervading
everyday life and the state’s power is waning.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1994, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
legitimacy has always been at issue. Scholars and policy-makers often refer to
the 1999 Seattle street protests during the WTO Ministerial Conference as the
foremost moment when the WTO’s legitimacy was challenged. 1 The protests
in Seattle 1999 were not only about the WTO—they involved overlapping
networks of protestors challenging certain theories and assumptions regarding
“globalization.” This included the protest against the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Vancouver in 1997, the campaign against the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment during 1997-1998, and protests against
the Free Trade of Area of the Americas in Quebec City in 2002. 2
Even though the WTO protests in Seattle were part of a broad-based
global movement, from 1999 to the late-2000s, scholars, policymakers, and
trade diplomats have spent a great amount of energy and resources responding
to the specific question of how to make the WTO more legitimate. Indeed, the
opening article for the inaugural issue of the WTO-commissioned journal was
entitled, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, and explicitly
responded to the street protests such as those in Seattle. 3 Some took this
moment as an opportunity to reflect upon how and why this so-called “crisis”
meant that the WTO was in a moment of transition. 4
Policy proposals ensued after academic reflection—several official and
semi-official reports examined what changes should be made to enhance the
WTO’s legitimacy. The “Sutherland Report” was commissioned by the then
WTO Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, and authored by a group of
eminent experts. 5 The Warwick Commission was chaired by former Canadian
Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew, and drew from consultations with over 250

1

See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock, Post-Seattle Reflections: A Qualified Defense of the WTO
and an Unqualified Defense of the International Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE
OF LAW 319 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds., 2001); John S. Odell, The Seattle
Impasse and Its Implications for the World Trade Organization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 400–02 (Daniel
L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) [hereinafter POLITICAL ECONOMY].
2
See generally THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE: THE NEW CHALLENGE TO CAPITALIST
GLOBALIZATION (Eddie Yuen, Daniel Burton Rose & George Katsiaficas eds., 2002) (giving a
sense of the different perspectives from the protestors’ view); ALEXANDER COCKBURN &
JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, FIVE DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: SEATTLE AND BEYOND (2000)
(giving a more particular view as to the strengths and weaknesses of the protests).
3
Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADE
REV. 7 (2002) [hereinafter Legitimacy Crisis]; see generally Daniel C. Esty, Rejoinder, 1
WORLD TRADE REV. 297 (2002). But see David Henderson, WTO 2002: Imaginary Crisis,
Real Problems, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 277 (2002).
4
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and
Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979 (2001).
5
PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2004), available at http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/wtosymp05/future_WTO.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), [hereinafter “Sutherland Report”].
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trade experts. 6 These reports proposed changes that could be implemented
within the existing WTO rules and regulations. 7 Recently, Debra Steger edited
an impressive collection of essays aimed at redesigning the WTO. 8 To Steger,
the question is clear that the WTO is in grave need of institutional reform.
Nevertheless, the problem is that “[t]he mandate of the WTO is no longer clear
. . . .” 9 She identifies two dominant and competing conceptions regarding the
WTO’s purpose: there are those that believe that the WTO’s fundamental
mandate is focused on trade liberalization and there are those that think it
should be focused on broader international economic regulation. 10
Extrapolating from Steger’s account, the way that these two mandates
are presented suggests that scholars will measure the WTO’s legitimacy
against some pre-existing conceptual construction of the WTO’s function and
purpose. 11 That is, if one’s working assumption is that the WTO’s purpose is
to liberalize trade, then the WTO’s legitimacy is measured against this
premise; and likewise, if one’s assumption is that the WTO’s purpose is
broader international economic regulation, then legitimacy is measured against
this purpose. The preconception of the WTO is thereby reinforced through the
way the WTO is examined. 12
Indeed, this reflects how the WTO has been discussed thus far in the
WTO legitimacy debates of the past decade. Scholars will usually enter the
debate informed by a pre-existing conceptual construction of the WTO’s
function and purpose. The pattern of the debate is often that the WTO is
assumed to have a particular purpose and to have institutionalized a particular
notion of trade. It will then be argued that the WTO should increase its
legitimacy by better adhering to this assumed function and purpose. Or, also
based on these assumptions regarding the WTO’s function and purpose, its
legitimacy is criticized for prioritizing trade as a value to the exclusion of other
values.

6

THE WARWICK COMMISSION, THE MULTILATERAL TRADE REGIME: WHICH WAY
FORWARD?, (2007), available at http://www.bmwstiftung.de/de/asset/index/mid/16/lang/x/file/o_document _de_19.pdf (last visited Nov. 1,
2011).
7
Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO: The Case for Institutional Reform, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 803, 804 (2009); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed
Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO, 8 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 329 (2005).
8
REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Debra Steger ed., 2010), available at http://idlbnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/40859/1/128972.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
9
See Steger, supra note 7, at 808.
10
See id. at 805.
11
See id. at 807.
12
See Patrizia Nanz, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalisation of Transnational
Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 59, 62 (Christian Joerges & ErnstUlrich Petersmann eds., 2011) [hereinafter MULTILEVEL TRADE].

66

67

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

While the results of the debate over the WTO’s purpose is important in
order to structure future reform, this paper takes this moment of conceptual
dissonance regarding the WTO as an opportunity to reflect upon how legal
scholars argue over competing understandings of the WTO. There is more at
stake than simply two different proposals regarding the WTO’s mandate. How
legal scholars debate the WTO’s legitimacy, and the conceptual or cognitive
constructions they deploy, in effect, contribute to how we perceive and
understand the WTO. 13
The problem is that allowing pre-conceived legitimacy criteria to affect
understandings of the WTO makes it difficult for legal scholars to effectively
determine how the WTO functions and clearly argue what its purpose should
be. I suggest that legal debates have obscured different conceptions regarding
the WTO because they have been framed in response to answering the
question: “how can the WTO be made more legitimate?”
In an effort to encourage sharper legal discourse, I flip the orthodox
approach on its head and examine the legitimacy debate in order to excavate
the different pre-existing conceptual constructions of the WTO. My purpose is
to reframe legal debates over the WTO’s function and purpose. I propose that
we should reconstrue legitimacy debates not to be solely about answering the
question of improving the WTO’s legitimacy, but rather to interpret them as
very specific ways of reinforcing and reinterpreting normative assumptions
regarding the WTO’s function and purpose. In other words, we can imagine
legitimacy debates not only to be about trying to make the WTO better, but
also about defining what the WTO is.
One important debate regarding the WTO’s legitimacy not interrogated
by this paper is the trade-linkage debate, also known as the “trade and . . .”
debate, in which trade scholars and policymakers have tried to reconcile the
WTO’s relationship with other international legal regimes such as human
rights, environmental, or labor law. Andrew Lang has already critically
examined this debate and has also shifted the emphasis towards developing a
clearer way of discussing and debating what the WTO (and free trade) can and
should be about. 14 To Lang, there is a significant danger of not being able to
transform the WTO without opening up new “rhetorical and imaginative space
. . . to re-conceptualise the nature and purpose of the liberal trade project, in
ways which respond to contemporary political priorities, and align that project
with the contemporary ideational landscape.” 15
If we then take the stalemate of the Doha Round, which was an attempt
to renegotiate the WTO in a way to make it more conducive to development,
the stakes are even more acute. 16 There is an increasing demand to examine the
13

See id.; Andrew T. F. Lang, Reflecting on ‘Linkage’: Cognitive and Institutional
Change in the International Trading System, 70 MOD. L. REV. 523, 529 (2007).
14
See Lang, supra note 13.
15
Id. at 529.
16
See Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45
TEX. INT’L L.J. 573, 583 (2010).
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WTO’s effects upon marginalized communities, 17 determine how to change
the WTO in a way that reduces poverty, 18 and question how to reconfigure the
WTO in order to “reclaim” development in the world trading system. 19 With
this in mind, one premise of this paper is that before we know how to
transform the WTO in a way more conducive to development and poverty
reduction, we must first understand what our preconceptions of the WTO are
and what is it exactly that we are trying to transform.
This article also responds to the broader concern regarding the dearth of
examinations of international institutions that are at once legal, theoretical, and
descriptive. 20 The WTO debate, much like debates regarding international
institutions in general, thus far, has been primarily prescriptive and undertheorized. 21 Nevertheless, an increasing number of scholars from diverse
perspectives are taking on theoretical questions regarding how and why WTO
law operates the way it does. 22
As already mentioned, jurists have usually focused on arguing as to
what conditions are necessary to enhance the WTO’s legitimacy against a
presupposed mandate. This stems from the assumption that the WTO as a
project is a good thing, and therefore its legitimacy must be improved.
This paper, however, is a descriptive assessment of the legal discourse
surrounding the legitimacy debate. I detail how certain legal arguments involve
an imagined social, political, and economic role for the WTO in relation to
markets, states, and non-state actors. This builds upon the working premise
that how we think and talk about the WTO affects how and why WTO law
operates the way it does. 23
Finally, the questions and methods examined in this paper represent a
portion of a larger dialogue regarding the conceptual role of legitimacy in

17

See B.S. Chimni, The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A View
from the South, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (2006).
18
See Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1399 (2003); Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law
and ‘Global Apartheid’, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003).
19
See YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
(2006); Asif H. Qureshi, International Trade for Development: The WTO as a Development
Institution? 43 J. WORLD TRADE 173 (2009).
20
See generally JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW 32–35 (2d ed. 2009); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS 586 (2005). But see B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial
Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (a notable exception).
21
See generally Jens Steffek, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse
Approach, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 249, 253 (2003); RONNIE R.F. YEARWOOD, THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION LAW AND EXTERNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CONSTRAINED OPENNESS OF WTO LAW (A PROLOGUE TO A THEORY) 10 (2011).
22
See, e.g., David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 444
(2000); David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and
Environmental Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279 (2001); Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law,
11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 527, 528 (2008); YEARWOOD, supra note 21.
23
See Lang, supra note 13.
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international law. 24 It is common for the WTO legitimacy debates to be
referenced within global discussions of legitimacy and international law. 25 We
are well-warned, however, against the limitations of treating legitimacy as a
question of trying to measure international law against some sort of normative
benchmark —it may be more illuminating to unpack how legitimacy is part of
a process that constructs and justifies particular substantive results and
inequalities. 26
I therefore reconstrue the WTO legitimacy debate in the following way:
I identify the implicit institutional theory of the WTO’s function and purpose; I
examine how these legitimacy debates answer the question of how the WTO
interacts with the state, law, and the market within the global economy;
furthermore, I highlight how certain conceptions of the WTO’s function and
purpose privilege certain social actors as agents of change and marginalize
others.
To be sure, scholars still query how to make the WTO more legitimate.
This question, though, is no longer just a response to the 1999 Seattle protests.
They now write against the backdrop of one of the official or semi-official
reports, 27 or within the broader context of development discourse and the
failing Doha Round. 28 The question that used to drive the legitimacy debate
focused on making the WTO more legitimate. Since the writing of the several
official and semi-official reports; however, recent discussions regarding the
WTO have shifted in emphasis. Some prominent trade scholars are starting to
think that more important questions that have been inadequately addressed

24

See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990);
Daniel M. Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001); FAULT
LINES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds.,
2010); Tetsuo Sato, Legitimacy of International Organizations and Their Decisions—
Challenges that International Organizations Face in the 21st Century, 37 HITOTSUBASHI J. L.
& POL. 11 (2009).
25
See, e.g., Jean d’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandere, The Complementary Faces of
Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, 34
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 190 (2011).
26
Hilary Charlesworth, Conclusion: The Legitimacies of International Law, in FAULT
LINES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 389, 398 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc Coicaud
eds., 2010).
27
See, e.g., Steger, supra note 7, at 804; Sungjoon Cho, A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy, 4
WORLD TRADE REV. 391 (2005); Gary P. Sampson, The Future of the WTO in World
Economic Affairs, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 419 (2005); Ann Capling & Richard Higgott,
Introduction: The Future of the Multilateral Trade System—What Role for the World Trade
Organization?, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 313 (2009).
28
See, e.g., Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development:
Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 221 (2006); Rahul Singh, The World Trade Organization and Legitimacy:
Evolving a Framework for Bridging the Democratic Deficit, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 347 (2008).
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include: “how [does] the WTO matter[]”? 29 and “[d]o we still need the
WTO”? 30
In order to rigorously answer these questions it is useful to have a better
sense of what is exactly at stake and what have been the social, political, and
economic implications of the legitimacy debate thus far. The legitimacy debate
appears in discussions regarding constitutionalization, the dispute settlement
system, and non-state actor participation and institutional transparency. The
divisions between arguments in the legitimacy debate are usually understood to
be between rule-based constitutionalization versus economic rights
constitutionalization, support for a more legalized dispute-settlement system
versus a more politicized dispute-settlement system, and sympathy versus
skepticism regarding non-state actor participation.
By reconstruing the legitimacy debate, I uncover how what at first
seem to be incongruent positions appear to be more related. Constitutional
discourse draws from a desire to reduce politics in international trade and is a
way of subordinating the state to markets or international institutions. Dispute
settlement debates are a way to negotiate the relationship between the WTO
and the state. Participation and transparency arguments derive from a shared
empirical assumption that the WTO’s power to govern globally is pervading
everyday life and the state’s power is waning.
Part II details what is meant by reconstruing the legitimacy debate. The
paper then investigates and reconstrues three forms of the legitimacy debate:
constitutionalization (Part III), dispute settlement (Part IV), and participation
and transparency (Part V). Part VI concludes the paper.
I. WHAT IT MEANS TO RECONSTRUE
OF FUNCTIONALISM

THE

LEGITIMACY DEBATE – STYLES

To reconstrue the debates regarding legitimacy towards more
substantive ways of understanding the WTO, we can consider the WTO
legitimacy debate to be comprised by different styles of functionalism.
Functionalism, especially in discussions of governance, law and development,
and administrative law, focuses on the purpose that legal institutions serve and
the objects of regulation in economic and political life. 31 In fact, functionalism
has dominated how international institutions in general are examined. 32 When
debating the WTO’s legitimacy, differences arise through varied conceptions

29

Manfred Elsig, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What does the
Beast Look Like?, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 90 (2007).
30
Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 559, 564
(2008).
31
See Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853, 855 (2005);
see also Peer Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the
Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008).
32
See ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 17–29.
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of the WTO’s function and purpose and objects of regulation in global
economic and political life.
Broadly, there are two approaches to conceiving the function and
purpose of the WTO that inform the legitimacy debate. What I call the
“institutional functionalist approach,” usually takes for granted that free trade
generates welfare gains and focuses on improving technical and policy
cooperation between Member States within the WTO by making the rules
more clear and coherent. The WTO’s legitimacy is increased by improving the
WTO’s internal regulatory coherence and/or by aligning the WTO regulations
with other norms of international law.
What I call the “economic functionalist approach” focuses on the
economic benefits of the WTO. This approach suggests that the WTO’s
legitimacy is increased the more the WTO’s structure and resulting state action
best reflect a particular trade theory. The assumption is that the purpose of the
WTO is to discipline countries to liberalize trade by lowering tariffs, quotas,
and so-called non-tariff barriers, which efficiently generates welfare. The
different forms of welfare generated by liberal trade include increases in
economic growth, market competition, and/or personal liberty. The more the
WTO reflects the appropriate theory, the more opportunity there will be for
increased welfare (however defined), thereby increasing the WTO’s
legitimacy.
Since I have presented the different conceptions as stylized
representations, and for the sake of space constraints, I do not provide
exhaustive references. Sometimes I use one particular author to exemplify a
certain approach; I do so as a reference to an influential part of a scholar’s
work even though one author may exhibit different approaches within the body
of their work. Showing the limitations and tensions of economic and
institutional functionalist arguments is not intended to be a critical fait
accompli, but rather it is a way to craft analytical tools that can start to sharpen
legal discourse in such a way that can clarify understandings of the WTO’s
function and purpose. 33
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION: SKEPTICISM TOWARDS THE STATE
A. Introduction
At the heart of WTO legitimacy debates are arguments over whether
the WTO does and should reflect a constitutional order. 34 The
constitutionalization of the WTO is not only a trade issue, but is also a popular
33

In this article, I leave it open as to the merits of a functionalist approach.
In fact, at times the WTO constitutionalization and legitimacy debate creates a degree of
acrimony between scholars. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International
Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769 (2008); Robert Howse,
Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Reply, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 945 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law
and Constitutional Justice: A Rejoinder, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 955 (2008).
34
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example within studies of the constitutionalization of international law. 35 Thus,
WTO constitutionalization is part of a larger discussion regarding which
perspective—constitutionalism, global administrative law, or legal pluralism—
is best to understand global governance. 36 This section, however, leaves aside
this broader debate of global governance and constitutionalism in international
law. 37 Instead, I examine popular conceptions of a constitutionalized WTO
within the context of the legitimacy debate and then reconstrue these
conceptions.
John H. Jackson 38 and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 39 make the two most
prominent arguments suggesting that the WTO should be understood as a
constitution. These notions will be discussed more fully below, but in
summary Jackson considers the “constitution” of international trade law to
mean the institutional reflection of however the world trading system actually
operates in practice. The world trade constitution is whatever emerges from
international trade institutions, and as such, WTO law embodies the current
trade constitution. To Petersmann, free trade enhances individual autonomy
and liberty by unrestricting economic activity and protecting individual action
from government interference—therefore free trade is a human right. This right
to trade is a priority because it is the primary right that ensures individual
liberty and autonomy. According to this view, since the WTO embodies this
dedication to free trade, it represents the global constitutional notion of the
right to trade.
Much of WTO constitutional scholarship falls upon the question of: is
the WTO constitutionalizing? Or put another way: Is WTO law through
practice and interpretation becoming more like a constitution in relation to the
domestic laws of Member States? Cass has argued that this is an extremely

35

Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 20 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALIZATION].
36
Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 15-24 (2007); see also Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, A
Functional Approach to International Constiutionalization, in RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 33–34 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD]. The literature in each
of these areas is growing quickly. For global administrative law see Global Administrative
Law: A Bibliography, INST. FOR INT’L L. & J UST., available at
http://www.iilj.org/gal/bibliography/default.asp. For legal pluralism see, e.g., NICO KIRSCH,
BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2011);
David Kennedy, One, Two, Three Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan
Dream, 3 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2007). This is not to suggest that
constitutionalism, global administrative law, and legal pluralism are hermeneutically separate
approaches. Nor do I mean to suggest that within each mode there is only one, monolithic
version.
37
See, e.g., WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005);
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 35; RULING THE WORLD, supra note 36.
38
See infra notes 52–57.
39
See infra notes 83–84.
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restrictive question because it reifies the WTO as something that someone is
either for or against and that:
It says that it is not possible to answer either the ‘is-or-is-not’,
or the ‘should-or-should-not’ question, because the terms of the
discussion already presuppose the existence of the phenomenon.
This makes it virtually impossible to escape from the terms of
the assumption in order to try to answer the constitutionalizing
question. 40
Other critiques of constitutional discourse, with respect to the WTO
and trade, have been that it privileges specific notions of legal forms such as
judicial norm-generation, 41 that it prioritizes economic freedom over political
freedom, 42 that it misleads because it places the concepts of the market and
trade outside of the social, 43 and that it takes for granted the social and
economic benefits of liberalized trade. 44
One survey of trade constitutionalism has determined that as employed
thus far it has been a “turn away from politics.” 45 Most recently, some have
directly responded to criticism that constitutional discourse may be a scholarly
attempt to minimize trade politics; they have conceptualized constitutionalism
as a way to encourage political contestation and enrich normative debates. 46
The question, therefore, is no longer whether constitutionalism inhibits or
encourages politics. Rather, one must ask what sort of politics it encourages.
40

DEBORAH CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 208
(2005); see also Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy:
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73, 74 (2003).
41
Ruth Buchanan, Legitimating Global Trade Governance: Constitutional and Legal
Pluralist Approaches, 57 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 654, 662 (2006).
42
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy:
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73, 74 (2003).
43
James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of the
WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 137 (2001).
44
See CASS, supra note 40, at 69.
45
Jeffrey Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline
of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 663 (2006). Some see potential opportunity and
value in a certain type of new constitutional discourse, which is more explicitly political. See,
e.g., Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31 (Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001)
(post-national or post-constitutive constitutionalism); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Politics of
International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization, in RULING
THE WORLD, supra note 36, at 178 (suggesting that constitutional discourse thus far has closed
down political debate, but that a new wave of post-national constitutionalism may prove
promising); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Constitutional Economics of the World Trade
Organization, in RULING THE WORLD, supra note 36, at 206 (constitutional economics).
46
See Klaus Armingeon et al., The Constitutionalisation of International Trade Law, in
THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: FROM FRAGMENTATION TO
COHERENCE 69, 72–75 (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2011).
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As such, what remains underexplored are the distributional implications
of constitutional discourse, which may thereby answer the question: “Who is
advantaged and who disadvantaged, who empowered and who disempowered,
under different constitutional conceptions.” 47 What also remains unclear is
how different constitutional conceptions contain within them certain
assumptions regarding the function and purpose of the WTO within a
globalized political, economic, and social framework. 48 Thus, this section
outlines how constitutionalization encourages a social, political, and economic
life that is skeptical of the state.
B. Institutional Functionalism
1. The Constitutional Debate
John H. Jackson’s understanding of the WTO as a trade constitution is
exemplary of an institutional functionalist approach. He has self-described his
own work as “functionalist.” 49 And to Cass, Jackson’s approach uses the
concepts of institutions and constitutions almost interchangeably. 50 As will be
described below, this particular use of the term “constitution” focuses on
describing and improving the WTO’s institutional structure. This approach
also takes for granted the benefits of liberalized trade and the ability of
international economic law to increase economic welfare. 51
Jackson was one of the first—if not the first—to use the term
“constitution” when discussing the international economic system. 52 Early on,
Jackson refers to the “constitutional law of GATT” to mean the institutional
history and structure of the GATT. 53 In more recent scholarship Jackson has
explained that he uses “constitution,” borrowing from the British tradition of
an “unwritten constitution,” as a moniker describing the institutional structure
of the “world trading system as it actually operates, including informal
mechanisms and ‘practice.’” 54 In other words, the world trade “constitution” is
47
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Dunoff, RULING THE WORLD, supra note 45, at 203; see also CASS, supra note 40, at
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Cf. Gathii, supra note 43.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 7 (1st ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, 1st ed.]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 27 (2d ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, 2d ed.]. I reference both editions to note the consistency of certain ideas despite
institutional structure of multilateral trade law expanding and changing from the GATT to the
WTO.
50
See CASS, supra note 40, at 28–57, 59.
51
Id. at 78–79.
52
See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 31(1969) (explaining
how the author will discuss the basic groundwork or “constitutional” law of GATT).
53
See id. at 33–190.
54
John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’
Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, at 70–71 (2001) [hereinafter Seven Mantras]; see also JOHN
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whatever norms and practice emerge from international trade institutions. This
“constitutional structure” of the world trading system is composed of the
international structure, national institutions, and compliance with results of
dispute resolution. 55 And in this complex constitutional structure, Jackson
considers international treaties to be the main component of this constitutional
structure. 56
Jackson’s concept of a trade constitution is flexible and adaptable to the
changes in the international trade institution. Over time, Jackson shifted in his
scholarship from talking about the different laws that make up the world trade
system constitution to talking about the “WTO constitution” implying that in
contemporary practice the world trade constitution primarily consists of the
WTO. 57
2. Social, Political, and Economic Implications
This notion of constitutionalism is not only a way of describing the
institutional structure and practice of world trade. To Jackson, the rule-oriented
(constitutional) structure of the GATT—and later the WTO—is the trade
system’s greatest strength. According to this view, a rule-oriented system is
preferred over a power-oriented system because it is more predictable and
because it overcomes politics and government short-sightedness. To Jackson,
this has the effect of redressing unfair power imbalances between nations and
prevents escalating international tensions. 58
Packed into the institutional functionalist understanding of the WTO as
a trade constitution, however, is a broader social, political, and economic
framework. In order to gain a clearer understanding of this framework, I
examine how Jackson describes the WTO’s relationship to globalization. First,
I suggest that an institutional functionalist definition of constitutionalism
obscures its own non-legal normative implications. Within this conception,
institutions such as the WTO are a central feature of global markets. But it is
unclear what role the WTO plays in generating deep global integration of
markets. This has the effect of making the WTO seem inevitable and necessary
but does not provide analytical tools to understand what the WTO’s role is in
global governance of political, economic, and social life. Second, I highlight
the normative assumptions informing the institutional functionalist definition
of constitutionalism thereby sketching its political, economic, and social
framework.
H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 49–53, 55 (2006) [hereinafter CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS] (Jackson has extended the use
of “constitution” to public international law to describe “international institutional law”).
55
See THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 1st ed., supra note 49, at 7.
56
See id. at 23; THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 27.
57
See THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 339–41; JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 103 (1998)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE].
58
See THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 1st ed., supra note 49, at 4–5; THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 8–9.
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To Jackson, globalization is an inescapable, pervasive phenomenon. He
acknowledges the ambiguity of the term “globalization” and states that it
denotes the interdependence generated by developments since World War II in
technology, communication, and transportation that effectively integrate all
markets into a global market. 59
Jackson’s work, however, is not clear as to whether the WTO is a
response to or a creator of global market integration. 60 Indeed, it is common in
most of today’s discussions regarding globalization to treat law either as an
epiphenomenon of global markets or to ignore law altogether. 61 In one regard,
the presumption is that the forces of global market integration are extraneous
to international institutions; therefore, the role of the WTO is to manage these
forces. 62 This suggests that the WTO is necessary to ensure that the benefits of
globalization are secured and the harmful effects are mitigated. In another
regard, the WTO is “part of the world’s institutional structure that is essential
for the satisfactory operation of the world markets, which experience and
theory have shown can be so important to world welfare. Thus, the
‘constitution’ of the WTO will clearly shape world economics . . . .” 63 This
suggests that the WTO constitutes globalization.
The reason this ambiguity regarding the WTO’s relation to
globalization matters is that it makes the WTO seem inevitable. And this sense
of inevitability makes it difficult to theorize what exactly is the WTO.
Globalization is presented as a given, almost like a force of nature. Thus, if the
WTO is both the product of and generator of this inescapable process of global
economic integration, it makes it difficult to unpack exactly how the WTO
contributes to globalization.

59

See THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 1st ed., supra note 49, at 1–3; THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 5–7. Jackson has commented about this global
interdependence during his early writing. Recently, he has adopted a definition and perception
of globalization that is highly influenced by Thomas Friedman, see CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 54, at 3.
60
See Seven Mantras, supra note 54, at 68 (Jackson describes one of the policy objectives
that “motivates” the contemporary world trading system as “managing economic
interdependence, or what some people call ‘globalization’”); see also CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 54, at 19 (explaining that “the World Trade Organization is the
central illustration of legal and jurisprudential developments influenced by phenomena of our
contemporary world (e.g. globalization)”). But see John H. Jackson, International Economic
Law in Times That are Interesting, 3 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 3, 7 (2000) [hereinafter Times That
Are Interesting]. Here Jackson states that the WTO has had “a profound impact on world
economic relations.”
61
Robert Howse, The End Of The Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1528 (2008).
62
See, e.g., CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 54, at 122 (stating that “[t]he WTO
has a very difficult role to play, because it must address issues that are being generated in the
world, with particular reference to economic issues, which constantly change and involve
problems over which governments and the international organization have relatively little
control”).
63
See CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 57, at 102.
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Despite this ambiguity regarding the role of the WTO in global
markets, upon closer reading, we discern how institutional functionalism
specifically imagines the WTO’s economic and political role in relation to
markets, states, and non-state actors. First, by drawing out institutional
functionalism’s theory of WTO law, we see an inherent mistrust of
government’s role in the market. Jackson lauds the WTO as an exemplar of the
rules-based approach to international economic relations rather than a powerbased approach. 64 In such an approach, law’s benefit is that it leaves as little as
possible to the power dynamics of politics. A rule-based system reduces the
influence of different scales of political dynamics: power imbalances between
nations, national legislatures being beheld by domestic constituents and the
influences of domestic politics, and national executive bodies making
decisions driven by their own personal goals. 65 Law “manages” international
interdependence and competing policy goals. 66 Law’s predictability also
reduces anticipated risks of global economic transactions. 67
Jackson suggests we must understand that the “over-arching” principle
of the rules has to do with economic affairs. 68 He treats economic thought as a
matter of established consensus. International trade law is therefore simply a
matter of implementing the “factual baseline” provided by general economic
theory. 69 Thus, if law is intended to avoid politics and put into effect economic
policy, then we must determine what specific economic policies are informing
an institutional functionalist definition of the WTO as a constitution. Jackson
relies on economic theories that dictate that international economic system[s]
should embody the idea of “liberal trade,” which is defined as the trade policy
whose “goal is to minimize the amount of interference of governments in trade
flows that cross national borders.” 70 Jackson notes that this is based on David
Ricardo and Adam Smith’s theory of comparative advantage. 71 Additionally,
he acknowledges that there is no definitive empirical evidence necessarily
confirming the theory of comparative advantage but considers that it has an
intuitive appeal because the result is that consumers get an increased choice of
products at better prices. 72
Jackson notes that there have been challenges to the theory of
comparative advantage. He concludes, however, that economists have shown
64

See id. at 89; THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 350–51; see also
Times That are Interesting, supra note 60, at 5.
65
Times That are Interesting, supra note 60, at 5.
66
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 8.
67
See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification Among International
Institutions: The World Trade Organization, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 823, 825 (1999)
[hereinafter Fragmentation; see also Seven Mantras, supra note 54, at 69–70.
68
Fragmentation, supra note 67, at 824.
69
David Kennedy, The International Style In Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and
the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. INT’L L. & REV. 671, 679 (1994).
70
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 2d ed., supra note 49, at 11.
71
Id. at 11–18.
72
Id. at 16–17. Jackson explicitly leaves Adam Smith’s proposition that what is good for
the family is good for the nation as an open question.
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these criticisms are unfounded and that modern models of the theory show “it
supports the value of liberal trade in surprisingly general cases.” 73 Jackson still
acknowledges the darker side of economic trade theory: “Economists instruct
us, that there are both winners and losers in this process [of reducing trade
barriers]. The basic concept of decades ago was that the advantages create a
rising tide that lifts all boats. We now realize that not all boats are lifted, for
one reason or another.” 74
Yet, Jackson does not examine how international trade institutions can
be involved in distributive issues and only considers how international
institutions shape and guide the market. 75 Perhaps this is because, for him,
distribution is a political or “non-economic” issue and international trade law’s
main purpose is to enact economic policy and avoid politics. When outlining
that there are winners and losers that emerge from a liberal trade policy, he
leaves it as an issue that can be ameliorated through domestic responses such
as safeguards and adjustments and not through re-examining international legal
structures—despite not being too confident as to whether safeguards and
adjustments are economically effective or politically feasible. 76
In light of the discussion above, the broader normative framework of an
institutional functionalist conception of a constitutionalizing WTO, can be
summarized as follows: There is currently a global market integration that
interconnects through developments in technology, transportation, and
communication; international economic institutions such as the WTO are
necessary to manage the interaction of cultural and institutional diversity that
arises from this interconnectedness; international economic institutions are also
necessary to create the coherent and cohesive legal rules that ensure the global
economy functions efficiently; these rules enacted through international
treaties ensure national governments remain adherent to economic principles
that outline how the market should properly function rather than make choices
driven by personal interest or special interest groups; national governments
negotiate international treaties that create international institutions, which in
turn act as a disciplinary mechanism upon governments to ensure that they
cooperate amongst each other and adhere to economic policies of liberal trade;
within this hierarchy of ideas, economists establish the normative frameworks,
diplomats negotiate policies and lawyers craft the technical and institutional
details.
With this framework highlighted, it is now possible to point out some
biases in forming this conception of the WTO. To be clear, every normative
73
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Seven Mantras, supra note 54, at 69 (emphasis added); see also THE WORLD TRADING
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position has some sort of inherent bias, but it is not always clear what those
biases are. This is especially the case for the institutional functionalist
conception of trade constitutionalism, which focuses on ensuring that trade
rules are “well formulated and effective” and “should cause certain kinds of
behaviors and inhibit other kinds of behavior.” 77 It is also important to draw
out the normative impulse informing this particular focus on rules.
Jackson’s treatment of questions of distribution highlights which social
actors are privileged by this institutional functionalist conception of the WTO.
Jackson notes that domestic transformations created by international legal
disciplining will create “losers.” He considers those who consider themselves
as “losers” in liberal trading systems as at times driven by irrationality or
emotion. 78 Nevertheless, the losers’ concerns are to be addressed through
domestic politics. Jackson does note that different leaders in business, labor,
and industry may very well lose political and economic power because of a
liberal trade regime like the WTO. He also explains that domestic (probably
U.S.) agricultural producers gain power through the WTO. 79 He ends, however
on the following question that future studies in international economic law may
want to consider: “[D]o the nimble, well managed multinational corporations
find their effective power enhanced by these international economic trends?” 80
This subtly privileges the interests of corporations by highlighting their
interests and needs.
This may very well be too close a reading of an understated point.
Nevertheless, what this line of thinking more prominently emphasizes is that
problems of distribution, poverty, and development are domestic and not
international questions. It makes it more difficult to ask how problems of
distribution, development, and poverty are caused by both domestic and
international legal structures, and discern how domestic and international
structures are interrelated. This point is important and the stakes are even
clearer if we consider that many reacted against the New International
Economic Order because it characterized questions of distribution as
principally an international and not domestic problem. 81 That is to say,
historically to raise questions of international distribution of wealth and power
made one a radical.
Finally, by emphasizing that international trade law is primarily made
up of treaties negotiated among states, that the WTO (created by international
treaty) is the principal institution that makes up the world trade constitution,
and that the WTO is generally a commendable result, Jackson shows some
deference to states represented by trade diplomats and experts. 82 More
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specifically, with the emphasis on rules, the greatest trust is placed in the hands
of trade lawyers. Thus, the state is thought to be politically necessary to
construct the WTO. Yet, the state as represented by other social actors is not
presented in as much as an agreeable light. The state as legislature and
executive is necessary to ameliorate dislocation caused by international trade,
but there is little confidence in the policy tools available to them. Moreover,
according to this view, the state represented by the legislature and executive is
not to be left to its own political devices and develop international economic
policy.
C. Economic Functionalism
1. The Constitutional Debate
Perhaps the most rigorous and contested proponent of the constitutional
approach to understanding the WTO has been Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. He has
written extensively in this area. 83 I will focus on some of his recent writings in
which he shifts from referencing “rights” to “human rights.” 84
Petersmann’s argument draws from concepts of human rights and
international law, and can be summarized as such: there are universal and
inalienable human rights reflected by the fact that general international law and
a plethora of national constitutions, regional agreements, multilateral
agreements, and intergovernmental declarations reaffirm these rights. 85
“Human rights” include liberty, non-discrimination, rule of law, social welfare,
freedom of information, freedom of the press, property rights, and freedom of
contract. 86 These human rights protecting individual autonomy and liberty
constitute a “freedom of trade.” 87 The WTO embodies an international
83

See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Detlev Chr. Dicke ed.,1991); see also ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997) [hereinafter
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM]; see also INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND GATT/WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
84
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration,
13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 621 (2002) [hereinafter Integrating Human Rights]; Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’ Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is It Relevant for WTO Law and
Policy? in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 357 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005) [hereinafter The Human
Rights Approach]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO
Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism [hereinafter Multilevel Constitutionalism], in
MULTILEVEL TRADE, supra note 12, at 5.
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See The Human Rights Approach, supra note 84, at 357–360, 370.
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See Integrating Human Rights, supra note 84, at 622, 626; see also The Human Rights
Approach, supra note 84, at 359.
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See Multilevel Constitutionalism, supra note 84, at 33, 45.
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dedication to this freedom of trade. 88 Therefore, (drawing from the EU
experience) to ensure the WTO’s legitimacy it must be interpreted in the
broader human rights context and be considered as a constitution (the “world
trade constitution”) amongst the other international and domestic constitutions
(he calls this “multilevel constitutionalism”). 89
To summarize, Petersmann’s primary concern is to protect individual
liberty against the intrusive actions of the state. He considers the market to be
the paramount sphere in which individual liberty is protected. As such,
international trade in a global free market is the driving vehicle for global
human rights. To Petersmann, the world trade constitution is therefore a human
rights instrument that individuals should use to ensure the state is kept in check
against invading individual liberty and autonomy. Petersmann is
simultaneously arguing that the WTO should be constitutionalized in order to
further the freedom of trade. Additionally, he argues that the WTO is already
constitutionalizing and therefore must be interpreted within the context of
human rights. 90
The normative critique is that Petersmann prioritizes economic liberty
and attempts to solidify its position via constitutional discourse. 91 The
methodological critique of Petersmann is that he slips between a normative and
descriptive argument and is vague in his terminology. 92 The human rights
critique against Petersmann is that his understanding of human rights is a
particular one yet it is presented as universal. 93 Petersmann draws his
definition of human rights primarily from Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and
Friedrich Hayek in a manner that assumes that these thinkers form a coherent
theory of human rights, and that the theory is unquestionable, and any
disagreement is inaccurate. 94 He has also been critiqued for buttressing his
argument by the “fact” that international human rights, as reflected in the
plethora of treaties, support his vision, and ignoring the high level of
contestation (politically, diplomatically, and academically) within human
rights discourse of the relationship between economic, social, civil and
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This is implicit in Petersmann’s arguments. See, e.g., The Human Rights Approach,
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Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2000) (makes similar
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political rights thereby privileging economic liberty. 95 Additionally,
Petersmann ignores one of the core debates in human rights discourse
surrounding whether and how human rights are universal. He assumes that
human rights are universal and normatively good. 96
2. Social, Political, and Economic Implications
Petersmann considers the WTO as the embodiment of ideal values and
therefore looks to further legitimize it through constitutional and human rights
discourse. His priority is to enhance individual liberty and autonomy and
considers the market the ideal mechanism to achieve this liberty. Petersmann
considers the WTO as the institution structuring the global market and
therefore wants to protect and further strengthen the WTO’s power and
prominence against governments captured by rent-seeking groups. 97 The WTO
as a constitution will discipline and rule over governments.
Petersmann wants to empower the individual to overcome the
government because he assumes government will necessarily infringe upon the
individual’s interest. 98 It is the trade policy elite, with specialized knowledge
and dedication to a liberal trade regime, who will structure the WTO in ways to
optimally affect international and domestic law. 99 An individual can, in turn,
pressure her own government towards economic liberty by invoking the
constitutionalized WTO through domestic courts.
Petersmann’s framework outlines particular politics within the
discourse of a rights-based constitutionalism that demands that domestic states
and institutions transform in adherence to a set of ideals that Petersmann
considers desirable and universal. The market is considered the paramount
institution, not principally for economic reasons of efficiency and growth (like
Jackson’s argument), but rather because it is the sphere that best ensures
personal autonomy and liberty.
The WTO constitution provides the main tool for individuals to use to
agitate against the intrusiveness of the state. Thus, the trade policy elite and
WTO adjudicators are acting as principal decision-makers in regards to matters
concerning the individual’s relationship to the state. If the WTO were to be the
main site of decision-making, then this would shift decision-making and
95

See id. at 821–22.
This debate in human rights that regularly reoccurs revolves around questioning
whether there is, can be, or should be a universal human rights. Current human rights discourse
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supra note 83, at 114-15.
98
See Multilevel Constitutionalism, supra note 84, at 26.
99
See id. at 35.
96

82

83

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

institutional power away from government towards the trade policy elite. As
such, the main actors for social change in Petersmann’s framework are the
trade elite who structure the global market and individuals who ensure the
national governments do not interfere with individual liberty. How a liberal
trade regime affects economic growth and distribution has only a secondary
role in Petersmann’s framework since the liberalization of trade is an end goal
in and of itself as a human rights value.
The assumed role of law and legal institutions is to limit government
action through individual action. This economic functionalist approach
therefore presupposes the state already has domestic legal institutions in place
(courts, administrative tribunals, etc.) of which an individual can effectively
use to reduce the regulatory role of the government. As a normative
framework, this approach does not provide an answer as to how people with
competing values may interact amongst each other. 100 Instead, it assumes that
most individuals desire a state with a reduced regulatory role.
D. Conclusion
Jackson’s conception of the WTO as a constitution, considers the
market to be the normatively paramount social institution based on the premise
that the market offers consumers an increased choice of products at better
prices, thereby efficiently allocating resources. Petersmann’s trade constitution
prioritizes the market because it considers the market to be the sphere that best
ensures personal autonomy and liberty. Jackson leaves it to domestic
institutions to ameliorate the detrimental effects of free trade and yet has little
confidence in the ability of domestic institutions in achieving this goal.
Petersmann relies on domestic institutions as necessary to limit the role of
government, and imagines domestic institutions buttressed by the WTO.
Despite certain differences, commonalities remain in these two
constitutional concepts. Implicit in both is a framework that delineates an
“economic sphere” that is separate from a “political sphere.” The “economic
sphere” is considered to be a place where actors, shaped by the market, achieve
the best welfare (however defined) for society and consider the “political
sphere,” mainly to be found in the state, as a place best avoided or limited.
Both approaches, and as such popular trade constitutional discourse, in effect,
privilege the decision-making capacity of private actors and trade policy elite
over national government actors.
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See Cf. Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of
WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE L. 161, 181 (2001) (highlighting how Petersmann’s
constitutional theory does not provide a way to balance individual and collective policies).

83

84

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: NAVIGATING BETWEEN
STATE

THE

WTO

2011

AND THE

A. Introduction
Quantitative studies that measure use and/or adherence to the dispute
resolution system have become increasingly common. 101 These studies are
often conducted in the context of addressing the following questions: “Why do
countries take some of their complaints to GATT/WTO and prosecute others
unilaterally, ‘out of court’? Why are some disputes settled with liberalization
by the defendant, while the status quo prevails in others? And has greater
legalization of the system made dispute settlement more efficacious?” 102
Such quantitative studies, however, do not detail what sort of legal
system the WTO creates. Thus, by leaving out a theory of WTO law, these
studies are not clear as to what sort of law state actors are actually engaging or
disengaging with, and the competing conceptions of efficacy that may be at
play. A theory of WTO law would be helpful to better understand how and
why state actors may or may not use the dispute resolution system.
One common assumption informing some of these quantitative studies
is that the more countries participate and adhere to the dispute resolution
system, the more the trading system becomes more legitimate. 103 Indeed, the
dispute settlement system is a central concern in the broader WTO legitimacy
discussions. Members of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) itself have considered
the issue of legitimacy; 104 some suggest that concern with WTO legitimacy
may influence how dispute-settlement decisions are made. 105
101

See, e.g., Asif H. Qureshi, Participation of the Developing Countries In The WTO
Dispute Settlement System, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, 475
(Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004); Nohyoung Park, Statistical Analysis
of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2000), in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM 1995-2003, 531 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004); Marc L.
Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO
Dispute Settlement, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 457; William J. Davey, The WTO
Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17; Simon Lester & Kara
Leitner, WTO Disputes Settlement 1995-2009: A Statistical Analysis Annual Statistical
Analysis, Surveys, and Indexes, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 205 (2010).
102
Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 101, at 457.
103
See, e.g., Qureshi, supra note 101, at 495–498; Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 101, at
477–478; Davey, supra note 101, at 49–50. See also Debra P. Steger, The Challenges to the
Legitimacy of the WTO, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
FLORENTINO FELICIANO 220 (Steve Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005).
104
In reading the number of essays written by former AB members, WTO legal staff, and
private counsel that appear before the WTO often published in law journals and scholarly
books, there is an implicit purpose of needing to legitimate the dispute settlement system. See,
e.g., Giorgio Sacerdoti, Appeal and Judicial Review in International Arbitration and
Adjudication: the Case of the WTO Appellate Review, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra
note 80, at 247; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”:
Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, 499 (Federico Ortino &
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The legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system has primarily
been measured against metrics of efficiency, efficacy, and legality.
Examinations of efficiency and efficacy are often made together and take-up a
considerable amount of legal scholarship. Efficiency is measured by the least
wasteful use of time and resources. Jurists will argue to reform the WTO
dispute settlement system in order to increase the ability to settle disputes in a
cost and time efficient fashion. 106
Efficacy is measured by whether states comply with WTO rules or
whether the WTO liberalizes trade. Compliance arguments propose ways in
which member states can be pushed to adhere to WTO rules and the dispute
settlement results. 107 Trade-liberalization arguments suggest ways to use the
dispute settlement mechanism to ensure that member states adopt appropriate
economic policies. 108
Legality is measured by determining whether the law produced by the
dispute settlement bodies is coherent and cohesive. The WTO dispute
settlement system is commonly understood to be a judicial entity despite
formal monikers of “reports” and “appellate body” instead of decisions and
courts. 109 As outlined below, the dispute settlement system and the AB, in
particular, generate debates familiar to readers of legal scholarship, and
especially to those who follow legitimacy debates concerning domestic
courts. 110 In this light, the Dispute Settlement Body is considered to be
attempting to generate different legal doctrines to give itself, and therefore the
WTO, increased legitimacy. 111

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004); LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO (Steve Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005); KEY ISSUES IN WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS (Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson eds., 2005);
THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Merit E. Janow
et al. eds., 2008).
105
See, e.g., GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and
Effects” Test (1998), in ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 359, 375–76 (1999).
106
See, e.g., William J. Davey, A Permanent Panel Body for WTO Dispute Settlement:
Desirable or Practical?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY supra note 1 at 496; Marc L. Busch &
Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.
579 (2009).
107
See, e.g., Brendan P. McGivern, Seeking Compliance with WTO Rulings: Theory,
Practice and Alternatives, 36 INT’L LAW. 141 (2002); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and
its Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, 976–77 (2006).
108
See, e.g., DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 36–37.
109
See Christiane Gerstetter, The Appellate Body’s ‘Response’ to the Tensions and
Interdependencies Between Transnational Trade Governance and Social Regulation, in
MULTILEVEL TRADE, supra note 12, at 111.
110
See, e.g., Sidney W. Richards, Survey Article: The Legitimacy of Supreme Courts in the
Context of Globalization, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 104 (2008).
111
For an argument that the WTO is creating and should further develop legal principles
to resolve disputes, see generally ANDREW D. MITCHELL, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO
DISPUTES (James Crawford et al. eds., 2008).
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The different methods of examining WTO dispute settlement legality
include theories of domestic public law litigation using the language of
administrative law; 112 arguing for internal coherence of WTO legal doctrine; 113
and, arguing for external coherence or sensitivity to broader public
international law norms. 114 To trade jurists, a principal concern is WTO
adjudicators’ relationship to the WTO text and member states. 115 General
issues include the role of the AB with regards to: balancing competing rights
and norms, 116 approaches to textual interpretation, 117 generating procedural
112

See, e.g., Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in
International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND
THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 42–43 (J.H.H. Weiler ed.,
2001) (makes references to “democratic theory”, and “natural justice” as understood in liberal
democracies as concepts to measure the adjudicative actions of the WTO); Frieder Roessler,
Are the Judicial Organs of the World Trade Organization Overburdened?, in EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 308
(Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001) (considering the structure of the WTO to be composed of
executive, judicial, and legislative organs and is concerned that the legislative organ cannot
effectively keep the judicial restrained as in domestic democracies) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY];
Steve Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 219
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, et al. eds., 2002) (examines judicial independence and
pressures upon it within a framework of “separation of powers”); Donald McRae, What is the
Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8-10 (2004) (considers the dispute
settlement system to be a hybrid of common law and civil law, and focuses on its common law
characteristics); Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675
(2009); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organization: Building a
Foundation of Administrative Law, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 509 (2007).
113
See Howse, supra note 112, at 51–61; Gabrielle Marceau, Balance and Coherence by
the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 326 (Giorgio Sacredoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes
eds., 2006).
114
See, e.g., Lamy, supra note 107, at 976–77; Howse, supra note 102, at 61–68;
Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753
(2002); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 440–486 (James Crawford et al. eds.,
2003); Peter Van Den Bossche, The Making of the “World Trade Court”: The Origins and
Development of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in THE WTO AT TEN:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 72-73 (Giorgo Sacredoti & Alan
Yanovitch eds., 2006).
115
For an exemplary collection of essays on different approaches to this, see generally
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS
FOR THE WTO (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
116
See, e.g., Howse, supra note 112 at 39 (the WTO is involved in adjudicating competing
values much like in domestic courts); Van Den Bossche, supra note 114, at 77–79 (the AB to
date has been successful in balancing free trade and other societal values ensuring fairness and
effectiveness of WTO dispute settlement system); Christiane Gerstetter, The Appellate Body’s
‘Response’ to the Tensions and Interdependencies Between Transnational Trade Governance
and Social Regulation, in MULTILEVEL TRADE, supra note 12, at 111 (the AB seems to be
explicitly using balancing between rights and norms but is doing so in style that gives the
sense that the AB finds these rights/norms in the agreements and is merely involved in textual
interpretation); James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: the Politics of Procedure in
Appellate Body Rulings, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 65 (2003) (the AB has responded to the need
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norms, 118 and generating law. 119 The role of legal doctrine to increase the
WTO’s legitimacy involves examinations of how the AB is attempting
different legal doctrines to give itself, and therefore the WTO, increased
legitimacy in light of the tension between legal consistency and member state
adherence. Discussions focus on procedure, rule of law, and how explicitly
normative decisions should be. 120
B. Tension Between the State and WTO
Underlying all three measures of legitimacy is a concern with trying to
resolve disputes in a manner that is legally consistent and coherent while
maintaining the cooperation of participating countries. 121 This tension has been
characterized as one between the law of the WTO (the need to resolve disputes
in a coherent and cogent manner) and the politics of state negotiation and
to balance coherence and compliance; and enacted procedural reforms that encourage
consensus rulings, improve its access to information, and expand its judicial discretion); Piet
Eeckhout, The Scales of Trade—Reflections on the Growth and Functions of the WTO
Adjudicative Branch, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2010).
117
See, e.g., Gerstetter, supra note 109; Dongsheng Zang, Textualism in GATT/WTO
Jurisprudence: Lessons for the Constitutionalization Debate, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
393 (2006) (arguing that the AB relies on textualist and “ordinary meaning” interpretation
which hides substantive or strategic policy issues and choices); Federico Ortino, Treaty
Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 117 (2006) (arguing for a more holistic approach).
118
See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a
Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE 477 (2005); Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez,
The WTO Appellate Body’s Exercise of Judicial Economy, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 393 (2009).
119
See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873 (2001) (arguing that
the Appellate Body is not just acting like a court but like an American court with a doctrine of
stare decisis which is rarely admitted in our thinking about the Appellate Body); John
Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?, 6 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 113 (2003) (arguing that the AB has exceeded its interpretive function and is generating
law).
120
See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections
on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191,
204 (2001) (“[t]he legitimacy of courts which is meant to transcend specific results and to
enjoy long endurance will depend on both the integrity of process but, in addition and
uniquely, on the quality both substantive and communicative of its reasoning”). But see Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, The WTO’s Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute
Resolution, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 197, 206 (2002) (“I wonder whether panels should be less
like courts—or at least the idealized version of courts that law professors frequently invoke—
and employ a bit more political savvy . . . ”).
121
See John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, 1 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 329, 345 (1998); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Debra P. Steger, The
Appellate Body and its Contribution to WTO Dispute Settlement, in POLITICAL ECONOMY,
supra note 1, at 482; Rufus Yerxa, The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in KEY
ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 3 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson
eds., 2005).
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institutional adherence (the need for states to want to participate within and
adhere to the WTO). 122 Some suggest this tension is acute enough to contribute
to the WTO’s legitimacy crisis. 123
Some argue that if the panels and AB do not take into account the
political ramifications of their decisions, states will ignore or discount the
dispute settlement rulings, which would weaken the WTO’s legitimacy. 124
Others argue that a rigorous legal analysis is more important because it
establishes legitimacy by ensuring that the coherent structure of the WTO is
maintained. 125
Indeed, some suggest that the relationship between international
institutions and their member states is the central tension for all international
institutions that has been theoretically unresolved for decades. 126 Rather than
attempting to find the hypothetical golden mean between law and politics, a
more informative way to appreciate arguments regarding the function and
purpose of the dispute settlement system, the role of adjudicators, and method
of interpretation would be to reconstrue the dispute settlement debate as a
disagreement over the relationship between the WTO and the state.
What distinguishes institutional and economic functionalist arguments
are the different ways in which the legitimacy metrics—efficiency, tradeliberalization efficacy, compliance efficacy, and legality—are configured and
used to overcome the perceived tension between law and politics. Institutional
functionalist arguments emphasize the legality and institutional structure of the
WTO by looking to theories of legitimacy that encourage the dispute
settlement system to produce coherent legal doctrine alongside the need to
ensure that states comply with WTO rules (efficiency, compliance efficacy,
and legality). Economic functionalist arguments emphasize the economic
benefits of the WTO and often use notions of legitimacy that focus on the
ability of the dispute settlement system to discipline states to liberalize trade
(efficiency, compliance efficacy, and trade-liberalization efficacy).
Institutional functionalists will either call for more political
considerations to inform dispute resolution or argue for the WTO adjudicator
to find the balance between legal consistency and member state adherence.
Accordingly, the role of the judge is central to the institution-building of the
WTO since her job is assumed to concern navigating the law in a legally
coherent and cogent way, ensuring state compliance and not just to “apply the
law.” Since states’ needs are a mix of the economic, social, political, etc., the
122

Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Tensions Between The Dispute Settlement Process And The
Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Activities of the WTO, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 301 (2002).
123
Id.
124
See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, International Economic Law: The Political Theater
Dimension, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON, L. 9 (1996); McRae, supra note 112 at 18–20; William J.
Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority: A Consideration of
Deference Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and its Use of IssueAvoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2001).
125
See, e.g., Lamy, supra note 107; Marceau, supra note 113.
126
Klabbers, supra note 20, at 1–13.
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judge is to find the right balance between all of these needs, but within the
confines of the WTO framework. Under this approach, dispute settlement in
trade law is argued to be more effective where more countries participate and
comply. 594 All this stems from an assumption that the WTO’s role is to help
manage the relationship between states on trade-related matters. Regardless of
whether the argument is more for politics or for balancing, this characterization
of the WTO considers the role of the judge as a primary vehicle to mediate
between law and politics through interpretation.
Economic functionalists assume that the purpose of the WTO is to
discipline governments to adhere to free trade principles. In this
characterization of the WTO, governments know that in “‘tying their hands to
the mast’ (like Ulysses when he approached the island of the Sirens),
reciprocal international pre-commitments [like the WTO] help them to resist
the siren-like temptations from ‘rent-seeking’ interest groups at home.” 595 The
WTO embodies a conception of a particular trade theory and its legitimacy is
derived from the inherent benefits articulated by this theory. The judge derives
her legal doctrine from this normative economic theory; her role is to sharpen
the doctrine towards achieving the benefits from this theory. Though country
participation in the dispute system and the WTO is necessary, ultimate efficacy
is measured in terms of how well the WTO acts to discipline governments
towards liberal trade policies.
The institutional functionalist emphasizes the role of the adjudicator as
mediator and primarily determines legitimacy by measuring state participation.
The economic functionalist emphasizes the role of the adjudicator as the
implementer of WTO rules and determines legitimacy by measuring trade
liberalization. This means that the economic functionalist places the WTO
rules and institution as paramount over the state, whereas the institutional
functionalist considers the WTO rules and state interest as something to be
balanced.
!"#$
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Institutional Functionalist

Economic Functionalist

WTO Law!"Dispute Settlement Body!"State

WTO Law
#
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Figure 4.1: Different Conceptions Regarding the Role of Law and
Adjudication in WTO Disputes
The different normative frameworks can be further discerned from the
different theories of law. The institutional functionalist’s core concern,
regardless of whether the argument is to ensure state adherence or legal
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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See, e.g., Steger, The Challenges to the Legitimacy of the WTO, supra note 103, at 202.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 36–37.
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coherence, is to preserve the WTO’s institutional structure. The main focus is
on the role of the adjudicators’ ability to “balance” between the WTO trade
rules (law) and the states’ intents (politics). Or to put it another way,
institutional functionalists assume law influences the behavior of state actors.
To them, the debate revolves around how central a role trade law should play.
When institutional functionalists think that the dispute settlement system is too
isolated from politics or that adjudicators are too legalistic they will argue that
the system should be better informed of the political implications leading up to
the dispute and ensuing results. When institutional functionalists are worried
that the politics of the day may make the WTO unworkable or that adjudicators
are too out-come oriented, arguments for balancing political needs and legal
coherence are made to ensure the WTO’s institutional integrity.
According to economic functionalists, states created the WTO and
comply with WTO law because of the expected welfare gains. States need the
pressure of the dispute settlement system to overcome domestic obstacles
blocking liberal trade policies. WTO adjudicators must thereby draw from a
specialized knowledge of economics and use law as an instrument to
implement the appropriate normative theory. To economic functionalists, the
perceived tension between WTO law and state politics is resolved by the
expected welfare gains of liberal trade theory. Because economic
functionalism inherently mistrusts the state’s capacity to determine and
implement appropriate economic policy, it grants policy-making power to an
elite group of decision-makers acting in an adjudicative capacity.
C. Conclusion
Even though debates regarding the WTO dispute settlement system
have often been framed as determining the appropriate relationship between
law and politics, it is not entirely clear that we can do away with the tension
between law and politics. 129 Instead of trying to avoid or encourage politics, it
may be more helpful to outline how various conceptions of the WTO dispute
resolution system entail different notions as to who makes political decisions
and how they make them. Of course, how both institutional and economic
functionalisms configure the relationship between law and politics is
determined by their respective theories of law and definitions of politics. They
are also structured by different assumptions regarding the relationship between
the WTO and the state.
We see that institutional functionalism is a way to debate whether trade
law should play a role in international economic life. It is informed by a
political theory that imagines the WTO as an institution that should be in
balance with state politics—politics is understood to be the negotiation of
interests between different states. Institutional functionalism is defined by a
perpetual negotiation between WTO law and inter-state politics, and debates
129

Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 7 (2009).
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trying to find to find the right balance between the two. An institutional
functionalism that argues for a more legalized system in effect privileges the
WTO as a site of global politics. Whereas an institutional functionalism that
wants to ensure that politics plays a role in how disputes are resolved is also
reasoning that the state will always be a viable place for global politics. What
holds institutional functionalism together in all its variances is a legal theory
that assumes that international trade law has the power to influence politics
between states in some way (for better or for worse). Economic functionalism
assumes that trade law should be central in international economic life. It is
suspicious of states’ political capacity—politics is understood to be about
ensuring welfare gains. As such, economic functionalism provides WTO
adjudicators more power to make legal and economic decisions that affect state
policy. It is undergirded by a legal theory that imagines international trade law
as a system of rules that, when implemented correctly, rationally achieves
specific welfare goals.
IV. PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY: RESPONDING
EFFECTS OF THE WTO 130

TO THE

PERVASIVE

A. Introduction
The question regarding non-state actors’ relationship with the WTO has
been a perennial concern of WTO legitimacy debates. 131 The query is whether
non-state actors should participate in WTO policy formation or dispute
resolution. 132 I use the term “non-state actors” because commentators use
different expressions and reference different social actors such as individuals,
corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, or social
movements. When examining public participation, it is also common to discuss
how the WTO could be more transparent. 133 More recently, participation and
transparency has become a principal concern of WTO jurisprudence. 134
These participation and transparency debates, like the disputesettlement debate, can be understood to be about the relationship between the
130

The literature in this area is extensive. For a recent symposium on the topic see 11:4 J.
INT’L ECON. L. (2008).
131
Yves Bonzon, Institutionalizing Public Participation in WTO Decision Making: Some
Conceptual Hurdles and Avenues, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 751, 760–64 (2008).
132
See, e.g., Jens Steffek & Claudia Kissling, Why Co-operate? Civil Society
Participation at the WTO, in MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 149–53; Yuka
Fukunaga, Civil Society and the Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 85 (2008). There is, however, some call to acknowledge that non-state actors have
always played an important and complex role in relation to the WTO; see Seema Sapra, The
WTO System of Trade Governance: the Stale NGO Debate and the Appropriate Role for Nonstate Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71 (2009).
133
Debra P. Steger, Introduction to the Mini-Symposium on Transparency in the WTO, 11
J. INT’L ECON. L. 705, 709 (2008).
134
Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on
Transparency and Good Governance, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 780 (2008).
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WTO and the state. Within the context of the dispute settlement system, it is a
matter of argument as to the hierarchy between the WTO and the state. In the
context of participation and transparency discussions; however, the starting
assumption is that the WTO in fact dominates the state’s policy-making
capacity. The question is thereby framed as whether to encourage or ameliorate
the effects of this supposed fact.
In this section, I first summarize how the terms of participation and
transparency debate—when understood as a legitimacy debate—can be
broadly divided into two groups. State-centric arguments of global governance
focus on the legitimacy and capacity of the state to decide matters that have
global effect. These arguments include different normative positions and may
be committed to or are skeptical of the state as a site of global governance.
Institutional-centric arguments of global governance focus on the legitimacy
and capacity of the WTO to decide matters that have global effect; these also
include different normative positions in regards to the WTO as a site of global
governance. I then show that state-centric arguments correlate with an
economic functionalist conception of the WTO and institutional-centric
arguments correlate with an institutional functionalist conception.
However, framing the debate as a question of the WTO’s legitimacy
and simply identifying which argument for participation and transparency
correlates to which conception of the WTO does not explain why a certain
argument is made. Determining whether someone is in favor or against more
participation and transparency tells us very little about the different reasons
why someone may promote participation and transparency as a good thing.
Thus, I identify the broader implications of participation and transparency
arguments. I do this by noting how from 1994 to roughly after 1999 the terms
of the debate changed. In examining this change, I discover that there is no
necessary correlation between an argument regarding participation and
transparency and a particular normative framework. A call for increased nonstate actor participation and more WTO transparency may be hostile,
ambivalent, or supportive of the state. Reluctance towards promoting non-state
actor participation within the WTO may actually stem from a desire to
maintain and increase the WTO’s legitimacy. Moreover, arguments in support
of more participation and transparency can be putting forward very different
conceptions of the WTO’s function and purpose.
B. Legitimacy Debate
1. Pre-1999
From the advent of the WTO, commentators debated the relationship
between non-state actors and the WTO. Most discussions regarding
participation before 1999 did not consider the participation of non-state actors
as potentially radical interventions questioning the legitimacy of the WTO.
Rather, the starting premise was usually that the WTO was unquestionably a
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good thing, leaving the debate regarding non-state actor participation to be
about whether their inclusion would undermine the function and purpose of the
WTO.
The central question was: where should decisions that have global
effect, matters of “global governance,” be decided? Scholars were generally
divided between those that were more state-centric and primarily concerned
with strengthening the role of the state, wanting to leave all discussions of
governance to domestic forums, 135 versus those that were institutional-centric,
confident in the legal personality, integrity, and robustness of the WTO to deal
with global issues. 136
State-centric arguments characterized institutional-centric arguments as
undermining state sovereignty and WTO functionality. The primary reasons
for excluding non-state actors from the workings of the WTO were:
1) Opening up the WTO will distort the decision-making process and
may lead to special interest capture. The purpose of achieving free
trade will be undermined;
2) Non-state actors are not representative or electorally accountable.
The appropriate democratic forum for these actors is their respective
domestic government;
3) Northern non-state actors and issues will dominate Southern nonstate actors and issues; and
4) The WTO would be undermined due to the “cacophony of voices”
muddling discussions between governments. Moreover, the WTO
cannot fairly determine which non-state actors should be in and which
should be out. 137
Here the assumed function and purpose of the WTO was to ensure that
international trade remained free according to economic theory—an economic
functionalist understanding of the WTO.

135

See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 295 (1996).
136
See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT. ECON. LAW 123 (1998);
Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Participants, 17
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental
Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996). But
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L.
ECON. L. 433 (1998) (Dunoff is sympathetic to inclusion of NGOs, but takes a step back to
examine the debate of the time. He argues that the debate is misguided for NGOs, primarily
business entities, who already play a dominant role in the WTO dispute settlement process).
137
Nichols, supra note 135.

93

94

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

Institutional-centric arguments characterized a state-centric approach as
“anachronistic” in light of the interdependency of issues that can only be
addressed on a global scale via international institutions. 138 The institutionalcentric scholars’ confidence in the WTO stemmed from beliefs that the WTO
was necessary because global questions required global, multilateral solutions.
The WTO was also considered to be able to make domestic governments more
democratic, and able to effectively address global issues. 139 This position, with
its emphasis on making the WTO more cohesive and coherent, stemmed from
an institutional functionalist understanding of the WTO.
2. Post-1999
After 1999, the ideas and interests underlying the debate shifted and the
arguments expanded to suggest that the WTO needed to be more transparent in
order to allow for the participation of non-state actors. In fact, the issue of
transparency was often linked with participation without any sharp distinctions
between the two concepts. 140
To be sure, the types of transparency prescribed differ. They included:
external transparency (how well do citizens and civil society have access to
seeing how the WTO functions); internal transparency (are smaller and
developing countries able to participate in the WTO and have access to
negotiations and information); and regulatory transparency (how well does the
WTO ensure that national governments incorporate mechanisms of
transparency as a central feature of domestic legal systems). 141
At this point in time, scholars were no longer responding so much to
state-centric critiques against non-state actor participation. 142 They were,
instead, primarily reacting against the notion that in the days of the GATT, the
trade regime operated like a club of a small number of like-minded relatively
rich countries who negotiated in seclusion and made all the global trading
rules. 143 There was a general consensus that the “club model” was inherently
illegitimate for its secrecy and elitism. 144 Propositions therefore centered on
doing away with the club model through mechanisms of transparency and
participation, which were expected to further legitimatize the WTO. 145
After 1999, even with some consensus that participation and
transparency would increase the WTO’s legitimacy, there remained a
138
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disagreement as to what this actually meant. Some scholars envisioned nonstate actors substantively altering the WTO. 146 Arguments for inclusion of
non-state actors, however, did not necessarily imply a desire to allow non-state
actors to have any transformative or substantive influence on the function and
purpose of the WTO. 147 Some scholars suggested that their role was to educate
the public about the benefits of free trade. 148 Others imagined the role of nonstate actors to remain within the confines of the state and suggested that their
principal purpose was to pressure governments for increased WTO
transparency. 149
Much like before 1999, this partly stemmed from different conceptions
of the WTO. State-centric arguments that drew from an economic functionalist
conception of the WTO were still distinguishable from institutional-centric
arguments that drew from an institutional functionalist conception.
The state-centric view argued for non-state actors to get involved in
order to discipline state action. The state was the object of concern because it
was assumed to play a detrimental role in economic life. This view considered
the WTO to be inherently good since it imagined it to be the embodiment of
free trade theory. The need to make the WTO more legitimate was then a
matter of effectively reflecting the principles of trade theory.
According to this view, the principal role of non-state actors was to educate
those who misunderstood the benefits of free trade, 150 assist nations with
technical know-how in order to fully benefit from the trade regime, or pressure
domestic governments to adhere to the WTO. 151 There was an inherent trust in
the “enlightened” non-state actor who understood, like the WTO technocracy,
and unlike many government actors, the benefits of liberalized trade. 152 Thus,
non-state actors were expected to contribute to the ideational and political
foundation necessary to ensure that the WTO is able to direct governments to
follow the precepts of free trade theory. As such, arguments for transparency
were either for external transparency so that the non-state actors had access to
the WTO in order to pressure the state or regulatory transparency so that it was
clear how domestic legal systems incorporated WTO law.
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The institutional-centric view argued for non-state actors to get involved in
order to influence and change the WTO. 153 Some scholars argued for increased
transparency and non-state actor participation in order to increase the
consideration of social issues and developing countries. 154 Others wanted to
make the WTO more democratically accountable and increase the exchange of
ideas. 155
The WTO’s legitimacy was thought to increase when it responded in
process and substance to the concerns of non-state actors. Individual and
collective action was considered to be prominent mechanisms for policy and
institutional reform; the state was thought to be still necessary in some capacity
to daily life alongside, if not deferential to, the WTO. As such, arguments for
transparency were either for external transparency so that the non-state actors
had access to the WTO in order to have in-roads to influence the WTO or
internal transparency so that weaker and developing countries had some
influence upon WTO law and policy.
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C. Shift From Desire to Apprehension
Table 5.1 summarizes the pre- and post-1999 arguments regarding nonstate actor participation and WTO transparency.
Pre-1999

Post-1999

State-Centric Arguments

State-Centric Arguments

-

-

-

Concerned with making
the state a more capable and
legitimate site of global
governance
Economic
functionalist
conception of WTO
Non-state actors’ role is to
be limited to the state and not
disrupt the WTO’s functioning

-

Concerned with the state’s
inherent incapacity as a site of
global
governance
via
international trade policy
Economic
functionalist
conception of WTO
Focus on external or
regulatory transparency
Reason for transparency
and
non-state
actor
participation is to work in
tandem with the WTO to
ensure the state is disciplined
towards
the
“correct”
economic theory

Institutional-Centric Arguments

Institutional-Centric Arguments

-

-

-

Concerned with making
the WTO a more capable and
legitimate site of global
governance
Institutional functionalist
conception of the WTO
Non-state actors’ role is to
be involved within WTO to
affect matters of global
governance

-

Concerned
with
the
detrimental effects of WTO as
a site of global governance
Institutional functionalist
conception of the WTO
Focus on external or
internal transparency
Reason for transparency
and
non-state
actor
participation is to work against
or ameliorate the WTO’s
detrimental effects

Table 5.1: Summary of participation and transparency arguments
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What remained consistent before and after 1999 is that arguments,
centered on the state’s governance capacity, derive from an economic
functionalist conception of the WTO’s function and purpose, and arguments
centered on the WTO’s governance capacity derive from an institutional
functionalist conception. What changed over time, however, were the political
and social implications of the state-centric/economic functionalist conception
and institutional-centric/institutional functionalist conception.
The first shift was in why commentators focus on the state. Before
1999, the concern stemmed from a desire to make the state a strong site of
global governance. A pre-1999 state-centric argument placed non-state actors
primarily in the domestic forum assuming that they can best support the WTO
by not interfering with its operation. After 1999, the state-centric concern was
built upon the assumption that the state is inherently a weak site of global
governance. Post-1999, non-state actors were called upon to support the WTO,
whether domestically or internationally, in disciplining the state. Regardless of
the shifts in state-centric arguments, what remained consistent was the
assumed purpose regarding non-state actors—that they were to encourage the
liberalization of trade. What differed were arguments as to where and how to
achieve this goal.
Similarly, there was also a shift in why commentators focused on the
WTO. The concern begins as a desire to make the WTO a strong institution of
global governance. After 1999, the concern with the WTO becomes a response
to the assumption that the WTO can at times be detrimental to some people’s
daily lives. The consistent dynamic underlying the shift is supposing that the
WTO is an institution that has global effect and that non-state actors must
therefore get involved to engage with this institution. What differs is whether
the outlook towards the WTO’s effects is optimistic or pessimistic. Before
1999 there is an ambiguity regarding the role of the state in global
governance—the call for a more legitimate WTO can incorporate either
support for or skepticism towards the state. After 1999, the assumption is that
the state should and does influence everyday life, and in light of the effects of
WTO upon the state, we must reconsider how the state matters.
An even more subtle dynamic can be discerned if we look more closely
at Table 5.1. There is an ironic turn from pre- to post-1999 arguments
revealing that the assumed function of non-state actors does not necessarily
stem from the same theory of the WTO. A call for increased non-state actor
participation and WTO transparency can stem from any of the following:
1) An institutional functionalist conception celebrating the WTO as a
site of global governance and that is ambivalent about the role of
the state (pre-1999 institutional-centric);
2) An institutional functionalist conception that is cautious of the
WTO as a site of global governance and that is concerned about the
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state’s diminishing role in global governance (post-1999
institutional-centric); or
3) An economic functionalist conception of the WTO that is skeptical
of the state’s role in matters of global governance (post-1999 statecentric).
Also, the assumption that non-state actor participation will transform
the WTO can stem from either:
1) An institutional functionalist conception that is worried about some
of the WTO’s effects, thereby supporting non-state actor
participation (post-1999 institutional centric); or
2) An economic functionalist conception of the WTO that is confident
in its economic benefits and wary that non-state actor participation
may derail the WTO from its intended purpose (pre-1999 statecentric).
D. Conclusion
Buchanan warns us that simply agitating to improve the WTO does not
necessarily affect current global systems of inequality because the relationship
between “transparency, legitimacy, and accountability of multilateral
institutions and the structure of the global economy” is not obvious. 156 What
should now be clearer is how arguments in favor of increased participation and
transparency have a variety of normative implications, each informed by its
own particular assumption of how the world economy is governed by the
WTO. Rather than asking how the WTO should be more transparent or
whether reforms are necessary to allow for increased participation, we may
instead frame these discussions within broader, substantive questions of
determining the WTO’s actual role in global governance and debating whether
it should play any role at all.
CONCLUSION
The unfortunate effect of the contestations and justifications of the
WTO’s legitimacy has been the obscuring of normative assumptions regarding
conceptions of the WTO’s function and purpose. One suspects that the more
the discourse continues in this tug-of-war of legitimacy, the more entangled
our understanding of the WTO will be. Rather than debate how to improve the
WTO’s legitimacy based on predicated conceptions of the WTO, this article
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has reconstrued the question and asked what is at stake when debating different
aspects of the WTO.
Constitutionalization is about subordinating the state; differences arise
as to whether the WTO or the market should preside over the state’s policymaking ability. Dispute settlement debates are a way of configuring a
hierarchical relationship between WTO law and state politics. In the context of
participation and transparency discussions; however, the starting assumption is
that the WTO in fact dictates state law and policy, and the main concern is
determining how to respond to the state’s weakening role in matters of global
governance.
Constitutional discourse privileges the trade policy elite and dispute
settlement debates privilege the WTO adjudicator. Participation and
transparency debates; however, do not provide a clear principal social actor;
instead, the working assumption is that social actors interact, negotiate and
resist (for better of for worse) within and in relation to the WTO.
If jurists remain within the discourse of legitimacy, their main role will
be to design the scaffolding of institutional reform built upon a foundation of
preconceptions regarding the WTO’s mandate. This would leave social,
political, and economic questions outside the purview of international trade
law debates. However, legal thinking can also be a powerful way to determine
the WTO’s function, re-imagine the WTO’s purpose, and argue whether the
WTO is even desirable.
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